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1 Introduction
Normative multiagent systems as a research area can be defined as the inter-
section of normative systems and multiagent systems. Since the use of norms
is a key element of human social intelligence, norms may be essential too for
artificial agents that collaborate with humans, or that are to display behavior
comparable to human intelligent behavior. By integrating norms and individ-
ual intelligence normative multiagent systems provide a promising model for
human and artificial agent cooperation and co-ordination, group decision mak-
ing, multiagent organizations, regulated societies, electronic institutions, secure
multiagent systems, and so on.
With ‘normative’ we mean ‘conforming to or based on norms’, as in normative
behavior or normative judgments. According to the Merriam-Webster Online [1]
Dictionary, other meanings of normative not considered here are ‘of, relating to,
or determining norms or standards’, as in normative tests, or ‘prescribing norms’,
as in normative rules of ethics or normative grammar. With ‘norm’ we mean ‘a
principle of right action binding upon the members of a group and serving to
guide, control, or regulate proper and acceptable behavior’. Other meanings of
‘norm’ given by the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary but not considered here
are ‘an authoritative standard or model’, ‘an average like a standard, typical
pattern, widespread practice or rule in a group’, and various definitions used in
mathematics.
Normative multiagent systems are an example of the use of sociological the-
ories in multiagent systems, and more generally of the relation between agent
theory and the social sciences such as sociology, philosophy, economics, and legal
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science. The need for social science theories and concepts like norms in multi-
agent systems is now well established. For example, Wooldridge’s weak notion
of agency is based on flexible autonomous action [2], and social ability as the
interaction with other agents and co-operation is one of the three meanings of
flexibility; the other two are reactivity as interaction with the environment, and
pro-activeness as taking the initiative. In this definition autonomy refers to non-
social aspects, such as operating without the direct intervention of humans or
others, and have some kind of control over their actions and internal state. For
some other arguments for the need for social theory in multiagent systems, see,
for example, [3,4,5]. For a more complete discussion on the need of social theory
in general, and norms in particular, see the AgentLink roadmap [6].
Social concepts like norms are important for multiagent systems, because
multiagent system research and sociology share the interest in the relation be-
tween micro-level agent behaviour and macro-level system effects. In sociology
this is the (in)famous micro-macro link [7] that focuses on the relation between
individual agent behaviour and characteristics at the level of the social system.
In multiagent system research, this boils down to the question “How to en-
sure efficiency at the level of the multiagent system whilst respecting individual
autonomy?”. According to Verhagen [8] three possible solutions to this prob-
lem comprise of the use of central control which gravely jeopardizes the agent’s
autonomy, internalized control like the use of social laws [9], and structural co-
ordination [10] including learning norms.
Before we discuss normative multiagent systems, we consider some discus-
sions on norms in the social sciences.
2 Norms and normative systems
In the 1960’s, the sociologist Gibbs [11] wrote an influential article on the prob-
lems concerning the definition and classification of norms, and observes that
the various types of norms involve “a collective evaluation of behavior in terms
of what it ought to be; a collective expectation as to what behavior will be;
and/or particular reactions to behavior, including attempts to apply sanctions
or otherwise induce a particular kind of conduct.” [11, p. 589, original emphasis]
More recently, Therborn [12] presented an overview of the role of norms for
social theory and analysis. Normative action is based upon wanting to do the
right thing rather than the thing that leads to ends or goals, which he calls
teleological action, or the thing that leads to, expresses, or is caused by an
emotion, called emotional action.
Therborn distinguishes among three kinds of norms. Constitutive norms de-
fine a system of action and an agent’s membership in it, regulative norms describe
the expected contributions to the social system, and distributive norms defining
how rewards, costs, and risks are allocated within a social system. Furthermore,
he distinguishes between non-institutionalized normative order, made up by per-
sonal and moral norms in day-to-day social traffic, and institutions, an example
of a social system defined as a closed system of norms. Institutional normative
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action is equaled with role plays, i.e., roles find their expressions in expectations,
obligations, and rights vis-a-vis the role holder’s behaviour.
Therborn also addresses the dynamics and changing of norms. The dynam-
ics of norms at the level of the individual agent is how norms are learned or
propagated in a population. Socialization is based on identification, perceiving
the compliance with the norms by other agents, or the entering of an institu-
tion. Norms are (re)enforced by the presence of incentives or sanctions. Changes
in either of these three three socialization mechanisms lead to changes in the
set of norms of the individual agent. These changes may be inhibited either by
changes in the social system or changed circumstances, or by changes in the
interpretation of the norms by the agents within the system.
Within philosophy normative systems have traditionally been studied by
moral and legal philosophers. Alchourro`n and Bulygin [13] argue that a nor-
mative system should not be defined as a set of norms, as is commonly done,
but in terms of consequences:
“When a deductive correlation is such that the first sentence of the or-
dered pair is a case and the second is a solution, it will be called norma-
tive. If among the deductive correlations of the set α there is at least one
normative correlation, we shall say that the set α has normative conse-
quences. A system of sentences which has some normative consequences
will be called a normative system.” [13, p.55].
In computer science, Meyer and Wieringa define normative systems as “sys-
tems in the behavior of which norms play a role and which need normative
concepts in order to be described or specified” [14, preface]. They also explain
why normative systems are intimately related with deontic logic.
“Until recently in specifications of systems in computational environ-
ments the distinction between normative behavior (as it should be) and
actual behavior (as it is) has been disregarded: mostly it is not possible
to specify that some system behavior is non-normative (illegal) but nev-
ertheless possible. Often illegal behavior is just ruled out by specification,
although it is very important to be able to specify what should happen if
such illegal but possible behaviors occurs! Deontic logic provides a means
to do just this by using special modal operators that indicate the status
of behavior: that is whether it is legal (normative) or not” [14, preface].
3 Normative multiagent systems
The agents in the environment of a normative system interact with the normative
system in various ways. First, from the perspective of the agents, agents can
create new norms, update or maintain norms, and enforce norms, using roles
defined in the normative system such as legislators or policemen. Secondly, from
the perspective of social order, we can also look at the interaction between
the normative system and its environment from the viewpoint of the normative
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system. In this viewpoint, the normative system uses the agents playing a role
in it – the legislators, policemen and the like – to maintain an equilibrium in the
normative multiagent system. In this perspective, we can distinguish at least
two levels of equilibrium. First, norms are used to maintain social order in a
normative multiagent system. Second, normative system contain a mechanism
for updating themselves, to adapt to changing circumstances in its environment.
Jones and Carmo [15] define a normative system as “Sets of agents whose in-
teractions are norm-governed; the norms prescribe how the agents ideally should
and should not behave. [...] Importantly, the norms allow for the possibility that
actual behavior may at times deviate from the ideal, i.e., that violations of obli-
gations, or of agents’ rights, may occur.” In our opinion, this is too general,
as a normative system does not contain the agents themselves. It also is not a
satisfactory definition of normative multiagent system, because it precludes the
agents’ control over the set of norms. We therefore use the following definition
in this paper.
A normative multiagent system is a multiagent system together with
normative systems in which agents on the one hand can decide whether to
follow the explicitly represented norms, and on the other the normative
systems specify how and in which extent the agents can modify the
norms.
Note that this definition makes no presumptions about the internal workings of
an agent nor of the way norms find their expression in agent’s behaviour.
Since norms are explicitly represented, according to our definition of a nor-
mative multiagent system, the question should be raised how norms are repre-
sented. Norms can be interpreted as a special kind of constraint, and represented
depending on the domain in which they occur. However, the representation of
norms by domain dependent constraints runs into the question what happens
when norms are violated. Not all agents behave according to the norm, and the
system has to deal with it. In other words, norms are not hard constraints, but
soft constraints. For example, the system may sanction violations or reward good
behavior. Thus, the normative system has to monitor the behavior of agents and
enforce the sanctions. Also, when norms are represented as domain dependent
constraints, the question will be raised how to represent permissive norms, and
how they relate to obligations. Whereas obligations and prohibitions can be rep-
resented as constraints, this does not seem to hold for permissions. For example,
how to represent the permission to access a resource under an access control
system? Finally, when norms are represented as domain dependent constraints,
the question can be raised how norms evolve.
We therefore believe that norms should be represented as a domain inde-
pendent theory, for example in deontic logic [16,17,18,19,20,21]. Deontic logic
studies logical relations among obligations and permissions, and more in partic-
ular violations and contrary-to-duty obligations, permissions and their relation
to obligations, and the dynamics of obligations over time. Therefore, insights
from deontic logic can be used to represent and reason with norms. Deontic
logic also offers representations of norms as rules or conditionals. However, there
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are several aspects of norms which are not covered by constraints nor by deontic
logic, such as the relation between the cognitive abilities of agents and the global
properties of norms.
Conte, Falconi and Sartor [22] say that normative multiagent systems re-
search focuses on two different sets of problems. On the one hand, they claim
that legal theory and deontic logic supply a theory for of norm-governed interac-
tion of autonomous agents while at the same time lacking a model that integrates
the different social and normative concepts of this theory. On the other hand,
they claim that three other problems are of interest in multiagents systems re-
search on norms: how agents can acquire norms, how agents can violate norms,
and how an agent can be autonomous. For artificial agents, norms can be de-
signed as in legal human systems, forced upon, for example when joining an
institution, or they can emerge from the agents making them norm autonomous
[8]. Agent decision making in normative systems and the relation between desires
and obligations has been studied in agent architectures [23], which thus explain
how norms and obligations influence agent behavior.
An important question is where norms come from. Norms are not necessarily
created by a single legislator, they can also emerge spontaneously, or be negoti-
ated among the agents. In electronic commerce research, for example, cognitive
foundations of social norms and contracts are studied [24]. Protocols and social
mechanisms are now being developed to support such creations of norms in mul-
tiagent systems. When norms are created, the question how they are enforced
can be raised. For example, when a contract is violated, the violator may have
to pay a penalty. But then there has to be a monitoring and sanctioning system,
for example police agents in an electronic institution. Such protocols or roles in
a multiagent system are part of the construction of social reality, and Searle [25]
has argued that such social realities are constructed by constitutive norms. This
again raises the question how to represent such constitutive or counts-as norms,
and how they are related to regulative norms like obligations and permissions
[24].
Not only the relation between norms and agents must be studied, but also
the relation between norms and other social and legal concepts. How do norms
structure organizations? How do norms coordinate groups and societies? How
about the contract frames in which contracts live? How about the legal contexts
in which contract frames live? How about the relation between legal courts?
Though in some normative multiagent systems there is only a single normative
system, there can also be several of them, raising the question how normative
systems interact. For example, in a virtual community of resource providers each
provider may have its own normative system, which raises the question how one
system can authorize access in another system, or how global policies can be
defined to regulate these local policies [26].
Summarizing, normative multiagent systems study general and domain inde-
pendent properties of norms. It builds on results obtained in deontic logic, the
logic of obligations and permissions, for the representation of norms as rules,
the application of such rules, contrary-to-duty reasoning and the relation to per-
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missions. However, it goes beyond logical relations among obligations and per-
missions by explaining the relation among social norms and obligations, relating
regulative norms to constitutive norms, explaining the evolution of normative
systems, and much more.
Some of these issues can be discussed in more detail. These include action
(e.g., the BDI model of agency) with models of normative action, to be combined,
reasoning and dynamics, and theories of normative action into implementable
formal models.
General themes that are to be addressed in research on normative agent
systems include
1. intra-agent aspects of norms,
2. interagent aspects of norms,
3. normative systems and their borders, and
4. combining normative systems.
In [27] a collection of articles on these issues is presented.
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